Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 38
Issue 5 November 2005

Article 6

2005

Preventing Repeat Offenders: North Korea's Withdrawal and the
Need for Revisions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Raven Winters

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raven Winters, Preventing Repeat Offenders: North Korea's Withdrawal and the Need for Revisions to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 38 Vanderbilt Law Review 1499 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol38/iss5/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Preventing Repeat Offenders: North
Korea's Withdrawal and the Need for
NonNuclear
the
to
Revisions
Proliferation Treaty
ABSTRACT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) took effect on
March 5, 1970, with the following purposes: to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear arms, promote nuclear disarmament,
and encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Even though
the NPT was initially intended as a temporary solution to the
threat of nuclear weapons, in 1995 the parties to the NPT voted
to extend it indefinitely. For the most part, the NPT has been
successful in achieving its goals. Recent challenges to the NPT,
however-namely North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in
January 2003-have revealed several weaknesses inherent in
the NPT. To strengthen the NPT, revisions should be made to
the withdrawal provision of the NPT, nuclear disarmament
must be made a priority, and the review process must be
strengthened.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international
pact that was signed in London, Washington, and Moscow by sixtytwo countries in 1968.1 The aims of this treaty are (1) to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear arms, (2) promote nuclear disarmament, and
(3) encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 2 The parties to the

1.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
2.
Id.
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NPT are divided into two categories: nuclear states ("those that had
manufactured and tested their nuclear weaponry before January 1,
1967) and non-nuclear states ("those that did not possess an atomic
3
arsenal.)
The five nuclear states are Britain, China, France, Russia, and
the United States. 4 Under the NPT, each nuclear state agreed not to
transfer nuclear weapons to any state that did not possess such
technology as of the date of the NPT and not to assist any country in
obtaining nuclear weapons or devices. 5 The non-nuclear states agreed
not to obtain nuclear weapons and ensured performance of this
agreement by agreeing to accept and place all of their nuclear
equipment and facilities under the ambit of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). 6 In exchange for a pledge by the non-nuclear
states not to acquire nuclear weapons, the five nuclear states agreed
to pursue good-faith negotiations in ending the arms race and moving
toward disarmament. 7 All parties to the NPT, including non-nuclear8
states, have a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Nuclear states, furthermore, may assist non-nuclear states, mainly
developing countries, in developing nuclear technology. 9 Each party
to the NPT, however, agreed not to provide nuclear equipment or
material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear state unless in
accordance with the IAEA. 10
The NPT includes a provision that calls for a conference twentyfive years after the NPT went into effect. At the conference, the
parties would decide whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or
merely for an additional fixed period (or periods)." That conference
was held on May 11, 1995, with the parties to the NPT choosing to
extend the NPT indefinitely. 12 The Extension Conference's final
statement required the five declared nuclear states to commit to
complete nuclear disarmament as expediently as possible. 13 In

Craig T. Mierzwa, Comment, The Indefinite Nuclear Nonproliferation
3.
Treaty: Substantial Accomplishments or Ambitious Hopes, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 555,
555 (1995).
NPT Review, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, May 1, 2000, available at 2000
4.
WLNR 4046978.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, 21
5.
U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
Id. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
6.
Id. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
7.
Id. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
See id. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. Article VIII, Section 3 of the NPT also
11.
called for a review conference every five years to make sure the purposes of the NPT
were being carried out. Id.
Mierzwa, supra note 3, at 555.
12.
Gary J. Meise, Securing the Strength of the Renewed NPT: China, the
13.
Linchpin "MiddleKingdom," 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 541 (1997).
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practice, however, countries on both sides of the nuclear divide have
not upheld their part of the agreement.14 Although Libya is a party to
the NPT, just last year it admitted to pursuing an illicit weapons
program. 15 Some have alleged that Iran is making highly enriched
uranium for bombs. 16 On January 10, 2003, North Korea became the
first (and only) country to withdraw from the NPT, after it admitted
to developing nuclear weapons. 17 Finally, the nuclear states have yet
to fulfill their promise to "pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to ...

nuclear disarmament.'

18

This Note addresses the need for the reformation of the NPT in
light of its inadequacies and the withdrawal of North Korea from the
NPT. Part II gives the background of the NPT and discusses relevant
provisions of the NPT that have been successful, as well as the
shortcomings of the NPT, including discrimination against the nonnuclear states. Part III discusses North Korea's withdrawal from the
NPT. Part IV gives an overview of the Review Conferences, and Part
V sets out three proposals submitted by Germany, France, and
Canada for strengthening the NPT. Finally, Part VI advocates which
portions of these proposals should be adopted.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY
A. Pre-NPT
In 1945, the United States brought an end to World War II with
the development and use of the world's first atomic bomb when it
detonated atomic and plutonium bombs over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. 19 Soon thereafter, many countries realized that the newest
threat to global security and peace was the development of nuclear
weapons capable of destroying lives. 20 In light of this concern and
developing negative perceptions of Soviet intentions, the United
States introduced the Baruch Plan to the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission. 2 1 "Under this plan, the United States proposed
to relinquish its nuclear arsenal to an international authority that
would assume control over nuclear energy. '22 This plan was not

14.
15.
16.

The Final Straw for a Fragile Treaty?, 182 NEW SCIENTIST 7, 7 (2004).
Id.
Id.

17.

Id.

18.
Id.
19.
Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global
Non-ProliferationRegime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 410 (1994).
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
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successful, however, because the country of concern, the Soviet
Union, "rejected the plan, primarily due to a lack of23trust and
goodwill between the United States and the Soviet Union."
The next significant U.S. attempt at stopping the proliferation of
nuclear weapons came in 1953 when the Eisenhower Administration
presented the Atoms for Peace Initiative. 24 Under this initiative, the
world's three nuclear states were to develop peaceful uses for atomic
energy, and an international atomic energy agency would be created
to inspect and control all nuclear material. 2 5 It also called for the
enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.26 The United Nations
enthusiastically embraced the Atoms for Peace Initiative, which
resulted in the establishment of the IAEA in 1957.27 Even though the
IAEA provided initial safeguards to prevent the transfer of nuclear
28
Several
goods, the number of nuclear states grew nonetheless.
states,
nuclear
of
growth
rapid
the
address
to
enacted
were
treaties
such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967.29 Once the United
Kingdom, France, and China joined the United States and the Soviet
Union as major nuclear powers, however, the international
community desired a more comprehensive treaty.3 0 Thus, the NPT
31
emerged as the "backbone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime."
B. Adoption of the NPT
Even though the NPT opened for signature in 1968, it did not
take effect until March 5, 1970, when sixty-two nations signed as
parties to the NPT.3 2 The major principles of the NPT are set forth in
its first six articles.33 Article I prohibits the transfer of nuclear
armaments from signatory nuclear states to "any recipient
whatsoever. '3 4 Article II bars non-nuclear states from manufacturing
or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other explosive devices
from any source, and from seeking or receiving any assistance in the

23.
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
24.
25.
Id.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
See Meise, supra note 13, at 548-49. In addition to the United States and
28.
Russia developing nuclear weapons, France conducted its first atomic test in 1960 and
China conducted its first test in 1964. Id.
See Cousineau, supra note 19, at 412 n.23.
29.
Id. at 412.
30.
Meise, supra note 13, at 550.
31.
Cousineau, supranote 19, at 413.
32.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, 21
33.
U.S.T. at 487-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171-73.
Id.
34.
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manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. 35 Article III
requires non-nuclear states to enter into a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA. 36 The IAEA is the primary mechanism for verifying that
parties to the NPT are complying with its terms. 37 The
implementation of IAEA safeguards is further evidence of the way in
which the NPT strengthens international security. 38 Safeguards
under the NPT, including international inspections, help to deter the
use of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes and, thus, are
an important confidence-building measure. 39 Article IV guarantees to
all signatories the right to develop research and produce and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; Article IV also sanctions the
40
exchange of equipment, materials, and information for such uses.
Article V stipulates that only nuclear states may conduct peaceful
nuclear explosions, while ensuring that the benefits of such
41
explosions would be made available to all non-nuclear signatories.
Finally, Article VI requires the nuclear states to pursue good faith
negotiations on "measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear
arms race... to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general
'42
and complete disarmament.
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the
NPT, the NPT was extended indefinitely without limitations. 4 3 By
January 2003, 186 countries had signed the NPT, making it one of
44
the largest multilateral arms control agreements ever effected.
Even though the NPT has yet to achieve its original goal of freezing
the status quo of the nuclear world, it has significantly impacted the
course of nuclear weapons proliferation by keeping the number of
45
states possessing nuclear weapons at five for thirty-seven years.
Thus, many nations regard the NPT as the first effective response to
the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the Cold War's nuclear
46
arms race.

35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, U.S.
Dep't of State, availableat http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm.
38.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, 21
U.S.T. at 484-85, 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169-70, 172.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.

Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Mierzwa, supra note 3, at 555.
Cousineau, supra note 19, at 413-14.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414-15.
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C. Inadequacy of the NPT
Even though the NPT is regarded as an effective response to the
threat of nuclear proliferation, it has been slow to achieve its main
goal of promoting nuclear disarmament. 47 This is illustrated by the
fact that "the US still has 10,600 nuclear bombs, Russia 18,000 and
Britain 200-and they all want to keep them. Add in France, China
nuclear warheads, a
and others, and the world tally is about 29,800
'
relatively small drop from 38,000 in 1968. 48
1. Non-Nuclear States' Ability to Develop Nuclear Weapons
Article TV of the NPT guarantees "the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." 49 Even though this was
conceived as an effective means of preventing proliferation, it actually
provides a way for non-nuclear states to initiate a process for building
nuclear weapons. 50 The non-nuclear states can legally develop
facilities for enriching uranium to produce fuel for civilian nuclear
reactors, and they may reprocess these reactors' spent fuel to extract
plutonium.5 1 These same facilities can also "produce highly enriched
uranium or bomb-usable plutonium-the critical ingredients for
nuclear weapons. '5 2 Thus, the non-nuclear states can use legal means
from the
under the NPT to develop these weapons and then withdraw
53
NPT to test their weapons and become nuclear states.
2. Discrimination against the Non-Nuclear States
Under the NPT framework, only five countries are permitted to
possess nuclear weapons-Britain, China, France, Russia, and the
United States. 54 The non-nuclear states argued that permitting a few
states to have nuclear weapons while forbidding others from doing so
constituted a discriminatory feature of the NPT. 55 Because of this

47.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at
art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173 (requiring that the nuclear states "pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ...nuclear disarmament").
The Final Straw for a FragileTreaty?, supra note 14, at 7.
48.
49.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at
art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
GRAHAM ALLISON,
50.
CATASTROPHE 158 (2004).

NUCLEAR TERRORISM:

THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE

Id. at 156.
51.
52.
Id.
Id. at 158.
53.
NPT Review, supra note 4.
54.
55.
William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the NPT A Means of
Strengthening the Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 735, 736 (1993).
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disparity, the non-nuclear states wanted to ensure that the nuclear
states relinquished their weapons as soon as possible. 56 As a result,
several provisions were included in the NPT for the protection of the
57
non-nuclear states.
Article X (1), for example, grants a party to the NPT the
sovereignty of withdrawing from the NPT "if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty,
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. '5 8 The only
other requirement placed on a withdrawing country is that it provide
a three-month notice to the U.N. Security Council that includes a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests. 59 Even though this provision was
included to protect states that may perceive that their interests are
being undermined by the nuclear states, it still does not solve the
discrimination problem because only the nuclear states continue to
60
have access to the materials needed to create nuclear weapons.
Since the nuclear states can only trade nuclear materials with those
states that are parties to the NPT, 61 the non-nuclear states would be
in a worse position if they were to withdraw from the NPT. Thus,
once a country withdraws from the agreement, it cannot receive any
nuclear materials from any of the nuclear states, even if for peaceful
purposes.
Another provision that was meant to counteract this apparent
discrimination against the non-nuclear states can be found in Article
VIII(3), which provides for a conference of the parties every five years
to review the operation of the NPT.6 2 This provision was enacted with
the hope of ensuring that all signatories were adhering to the
underlying purposes and objectives of the NPT. 63 Even though this
principle was reinforced at the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT
when the countries made an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate
their nuclear arsenals, 64 there has been limited progress toward
nuclear disarmament. 65 That not even a quarter of all of the nuclear
weapons that existed at the inception of the NPT have been disarmed
exhibits the profound weakness of the NPT in this area.6 6 This

56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 737.
58.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at art.
X, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
59.
Id.
60.
See id. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
61.
Id.
62.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at art.
VII, 21 U.T.S. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173-74.
63.
Epstein & Szasz, supra note 55, at 743.
64.
The Final Straw for a FragileTreaty?, supra note 14, at 7.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
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weakness is due in part to the fact that "the NPT lacks specific
regulations or timelines to govern the cessation of nuclear weapons
production or the disarmament of [nuclear states] .,67 Thus, the lack
of mechanisms to force the nuclear states to comply with their
obligations under the NPT strengthens the argument that the nonnuclear states are victims of discrimination.
That the NPT appears to inherently discriminate against nonnuclear states has made some countries, namely North Korea,
hesitant in agreeing to comply with the NPT. North Korea firmly
by serious
stands by its contention that the NPT is characterized
68
states.
nuclear
the
toward
partiality
and
discrimination

III. NORTH KOREA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT
North Korea was hesitant to join the NPT because of the treaty's
inherent discriminatory qualifies. Despite its reservations, on
December 12, 1985, North Korea, in the interest of turning the
Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, joined the NPT as a nonnuclear state.6 9 North Korea's main objective behind acceding to the
NPT was to satisfactorily solve its power problems with nuclear
energy. 70 Further, it sought to remove the United States as a nuclear
threat.7 1 Even though Article III of the NPT requires each nonnuclear state to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to
verify the non-nuclear state's compliance with its Article II obligation
under to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear explosives,
North Korea was hesitant to enter into such an agreement because of
its belief that the United States posed a nuclear threat to its
country. 72 After receiving assurances from the United States that it
would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea and
representations from South Korea that there were no nuclear
weapons within its borders, North Korea entered into a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA on January 30, 1992. 73 North Korea based
its compliance on the premise that "none of the NPT member
countries will deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and

67.
Meise, supra note 13, at 551.
DPRK Urges UN to Avoid Applying Double Standards on NPT (Xinhua
68.
News Agency broadcast June 27, 2003).

69.

KCNA Detailed Report on Circumstancesof DPRK's Withdrawal from NPT,

KOREAN NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 23, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/

200312003011newsO1/23.htm.
Id.
70.
71.

Id.

See Charles J. Moxley, The Sword in the Mirror-theLawfulness of North
72.
Korea's use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Based on the United States'
Legitimization of Nuclear Weapons, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1379, 1384 (2004).

73.

Id.
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pose a nuclear threat to the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of
Korea] .74, The safeguards agreement provided for measurements and
observations of North Korean nuclear material and facilities by IAEA
inspectors. 75 Article 26 of the safeguards agreement provides, "This
Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea is party to [the NPT]. 76 This logically implies that
if North Korea were to withdraw from the NPT, then it would no
longer remain bound by the safeguards agreement.
Unfortunately, North Korea's commitment to the nonproliferation effort ended rather abruptly when, in January 1993, it
became the first signatory to abandon the NPT by refusing to allow
inspections of its nuclear sites. 77 On March 12, 1993, pursuant to
Article X(1) of the NPT, North Korea advised the U.N. Security
Council of its intent to withdraw from the NPT. 78 Not surprisingly,
this revelation provoked an international response and eventually led
to diplomatic talks between North Korea and the United States. 79 In
1993, after the Clinton administration agreed to a negotiation
meeting, North Korea "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT. 80
North Korea, however, was unrelenting in its refusal to allow the
IAEA to perform special inspections and regular inspections of
facilities as designated under the safeguards agreement.8 1 As concern
over North Korea's blatant disregard of its obligation to allow
inspections mounted, a military confrontation with the United States
almost occurred in June 1994.82 Nevertheless, North Korea used its
potential status as a nuclear threat as leverage to avoid a military
engagement and coerce the United States into high-level
negotiations. 83 The result of these negotiations was the "Agreed
'84
Framework.

74.
Id.
75.
Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2003, http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh96.htm.
76.
Id.
77.
Erik Raines, Note, North Korea: Analyzing the "New" Nuclear Threat, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 349, 355 (2004).

78.

Christian Sano Homsi, Note, "Self-Contained Regimes--No Cop-Out for

North Korea!, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REV. 89, 91 (2000).

79.
Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, CRS Issue Brief
for Congress, Aug. 27, 2003, at 13, http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
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A. The Agreed Framework
The Agreed Framework was signed by the United States and
North Korea on October 21, 1994, and provided certain stipulations
for both sides to uphold. Under this agreement, North Korea would
halt its existing nuclear program and agree to enhanced IAEA
safeguards.8 5 Both sides would cooperate to replace North Korea's
graphite- moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water
(LWR) power plants.8 6 Finally, both countries agreed to move toward
full normalization of political and economic relations by working
together to establish peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula and to strengthen the international nuclear non87
proliferation regime.
Unfortunately, the Agreed Framework only provided a
temporary resolution to the tension between North Korea and the
international community in regards to the non-proliferation regime.
On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced its official withdrawal
from the NPT, citing U.S. aggression towards the country as its
reason for withdrawal.88 North Korea claimed that it could "no longer
remain bound by the NPT, allowing [our] country's security and the
dignity of our nation to be infringed upon."8 9 In addition to its
withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea announced that it was
abandoning its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 90 In asserting
"self-defense" as its primary reason for withdrawing from the NPT,
North Korea seemed to be relying on Article X of the NPT, which
allows withdrawal if extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the NPT have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
91
country.
North Korea has supported its accusation against the United
States with several instances of what it labels as deviance by the
United States. 92 For example, North Korea claims that the United
States instigated the IAEA's performance of "special inspections" on

Status,
Programs-Current
Nuclear Weapons
Steven Aftergood,
85.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html (last updated June 9, 2003).
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
88.
North Korea Withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Today,
THE NEW YORK POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at 4.

89.
90.

Id.
Major excerpts of KPRK statement on quitting NPT, XINHUA GENERAL

NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 10, 2003.

See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, 21
91.
U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
92.
See generally, U.S. to blame for derailing process of denuclearization of
Korean Peninsula, KOREAN

CENTRAL

NEWS

AGENCY OF DPRK,

May

12,

2003,

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2O03/2OO305/newsO5/13.htm (describing North Korea's view
of the United States deviance).
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the Korean peninsula. 9 3 Additionally, North Korea asserted that in
February 1997 the United States introduced depleted uranium bombs
and deployed them for actual war even though the use of such bombs
is banned internationally. 94 Moreover, in March 2002, the United
States adopted a policy to mount preemptive nuclear attacks on seven
countries, including North Korea. 95 North Korea viewed these actions
taken by the United States, a nuclear state under the NPT, as a
wanton violation of the basic spirit of the NPT which calls on the
nuclear weapons states to refrain from threatening other countries with
[nuclear weapons] or using them against other countries and creating
emergency cases endangering the fundamental interests of non-nuclear
96
states and exert all efforts to avert a nuclear war.

Other accusations included a claim that the United States has failed
to fulfill its obligations to North Korea under the Agreed Framework
by neglecting to provide LWR reactors and suspending its promise of
heavy oil shipments. 97 North Korea further stated that the United
States had "instigated even the JAEA to internalize its moves to stifle
the DPRK, thus putting into practice its declaration of a war against
the DPRK."98 Even though North Korea cited self-defense as the
motive for its withdrawal, it has stated that it has no intention to
produce nuclear weapons: "Though we pull out of the NPT, we have
no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at
this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the
production of electricity." 99
Despite North Korea's statement that its nuclear activities will
be limited to peaceful purposes, the IAEA's Director General
Mohamed El Baradei categorized the withdrawal as a defiant act
against the NPT and argued that because "the NPT is the
'cornerstone' of international efforts to contain the spread of nuclear
weapons... [a] challenge to the integrity of that Treaty may [pose] a
threat to international peace and security."10 0 El Baradei also
reminded North Korea that pursuant to Article X of the NPT, a
withdrawal only takes effect after three months of its
announcement. 0 1 North Korea responded by sending a letter to the
IAEA stating that its withdrawal would be immediate due to its
10 2
announcement in 1993 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
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North Korea supported this contention by stating that it had declared
a moratorium on its withdrawal in light of the agreement reached
between it and the United States, but since the United States had
now violated that agreement, North Korea was declaring an
immediate and effectual withdrawal. 10 3 Regarding the IAEA's charge
that North Korea is threatening international peace and security,
North Korea accused the IAEA of abandoning the principles of
impartiality and fairness that are supposed to be inherent in the
04
NPT.1
B. North Korea's Potential as a Nuclear Threat
Although North Korea has stated that it intends to use nuclear
materials solely for peaceful purposes, its leaders have made
statements indicating otherwise. North Korea argues that since it has
withdrawn from the NPT and terminated its Safeguard Agreement
with the IAEA, like other nuclear powers, it is no longer subject to
international law as to nuclear weapons. 10 5 In very clear terms,
North Korea has stated that it "will build up a powerful physical
deterrent force capable of neutralizing any sophisticated and nuclear
weapons with less spending unless the U.S. gives up its hostile policy
toward the DPRK." 10 6 It has also stated that it will "increase its selfdefensive capacity strong enough to destroy aggressors at a single
stroke."'10 7 North Korea also uses the U.S.-led war in Iraq as a reason
to decline inspections and refuse to dismantle its nuclear weapons:
"What has happened in Iraq shows that if we agree to disarmament
through unjustified inspections, it will not prevent a war but actually
invite one.' 08 North Korea will concede and allow inspections and the
dismantling of its nuclear program only if it receives written
guarantees from the United States not to invade and to provide
economic aid to the country.' 0 9
Given these threats made by North Korea, the question is
whether North Korea has the capabilities of becoming a nuclear
state? There is no definite answer to this question because the true

103.
DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT now effectual: official, XINHUA GENERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11, 2003.
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104.
Pressure,BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC-POLITICAL (London], Jan. 14, 2003.
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Moxley, supra note 71, at 1394.
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Policy", KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY OF DPRK, June 9, 2003, available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprkO609O3.html.
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extent of North Korea's nuclear program is unclear. 110 Some facts are
certain, however. First, North Korea possesses the means to produce
plutonium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons."1 Second, in the city
of Yongbyon, North Korea has an operating nuclear reactor that can
produce enough plutonium for approximately one nuclear weapon per
year. 112 Third, North Korea has demonstrated the ability to produce
and purify plutonium, having produced at least small amounts in the
1980s and early 1990s. 11 3 Lastly, North Korea is known to have
possessed about 8,000 spent fuel rods, enough for five or six nuclear
weapons.

114

Beyond that, there has been a substantial amount of speculation
concerning what North Korea has been able to accomplish since
nuclear inspectors were expelled from the country in December
2002.115 Since the expulsion of the inspectors, however, North Korea
has been very visible and vocal in regards to its endeavor to build a
nuclear weapons program. In April 2003, North Korea took 8,000
spent fuel rods out of storage-a prerequisite for extracting
plutonium. 1 16 In May 2003, Pyongyang renounced the 1991 joint
declaration it signed with South Korea pledging to keep the Korean
peninsula non-nuclear. 117 In October 2003, Pyongyang announced
that it finished reprocessing the fuel rods and was building nuclear
weapons. 118 In response to these facts, President Bush's advisers
believe that North Korea could be telling the truth about having
turned 8,000 nuclear fuel rods into enough weapons-grade plutonium
for several warheads, while others in the State Department are more
skeptical because there is still no definitive proof and plenty of
incentive for North Korea to lie. 119 The IAEA is somewhere in the
middle and believes that North Korea has probably produced enough
120
plutonium to make two new nuclear weapons.
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C. Implications of North Korea's Withdrawal From the NPT and
PossibleNuclear Program
Arguably, the most important implication of the North Korean
situation is the revelation that the withdrawal provision of the NPT
overwhelmingly weakens the effect of the NPT by allowing
withdrawing countries to subjectively determine what "extraordinary
events" jeopardize its national security. 12 1 North Korea has taken
advantage of this weakness in the NPT by pointing towards both the
U.S.'s direct use and alleged indirect use of a "hostile policy" through
the IAEA as the "extraordinary events" which jeopardize North
such subjective
national security. 122 By allowing
Korea's
determinations of "extraordinary events," the NPT's own purpose has
been severely compromised. 123 North Korea's withdrawal proves that
a country can enter the NPT as a non-nuclear state and then, as long
as the country deems that it is in peril, withdraw regardless of
whether it has made its determination in good faith.
North Korea further exploited the weakness of the NPT in this
area by declaring "an automatic and immediate effectuation of its
withdrawal from the [NPT]."'1 24 By declaring this withdrawal and
immediately operating as if it were no longer subject to the NPT,
North Korea did not respect the ninety-day waiting period required
by the NPT prior to withdrawal from the NPT and showed the
international community that there will be no ramifications for such
actions. 12 5 The immediate implication of North Korea's decision not to
abide by the Article X waiting period is that the lack of a means of
enforcement of the withdrawal period substantially weakens the force
of the NPT. 126 Furthermore, the existence of a nuclear weapons
program in North Korea may lead nearby countries like South Korea
and Japan to abandon the nuclear non-proliferation regime and
develop nuclear weapons as a means of self-defense. 1 27 The reality is
that absent safeguards-such as the ability of inspectors to monitor
these facilities-and without a North Korean commitment to abide by
its obligations under the NPT, the United States and the rest of the
international community are powerless to stop a dictatorial regime
from progressing toward becoming a nuclear power and a global
128
threat.
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North Korea's declaration of a secret nuclear program and the
subsequent implications serve as key indicators of the need for the
reconstruction of the NPT. 129 The present situation, in which a
previous signatory to the NPT can unilaterally decide that it is at risk
of attack and then begin to build a nuclear weapons program as a
means of self-defense, poses serious dangers to the peace and security
of the international community.1 30 Moreover, the fact that North
Korea was classified as a non-nuclear state when it became a
signatory to the treaty makes the problem more disturbing, for if a
non-nuclear state can withdraw and not be subject to ramifications,
then it would be quite troublesome if a country that is already
established as a nuclear state were to withdraw in such a manner. In
either case, North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and the NPT's
inability to control it indicate the need for revisions to be made to the
NPT.

IV. NPT REVIEW

CONFERENCES

Article VIII of the NPT establishes regular conferences at
intervals of five years to review the operation of the NPT. 13 1 At these
review conferences, the operation of the NPT should be reviewed to
assure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the
NPT are being realized. 132 Six such conferences have been held since
the NPT took effect.' 3 3 In short, the first four Review Conferences
discussed two main concepts: (1) the strengthening and consolidation
of the horizontal non-proliferation regime and (2) how to resolve the
slow progress with regard to the termination of the nuclear arms race
13 4
and nuclear disarmament.
Since the NPT was initially drafted as a temporary solution to
nuclear proliferation, it also included a provision requiring, after
twenty-five years of its entry into force, that a conference be held to
determine whether to extend the NPT temporarily, make it

129.
Id. at 367.
130.
Id.
131.
See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, 21
U.S.T. at 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174.
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preceding NPT, http://www.nti.org/e-research/officialdocs/
inventory/pdfs/npt.pdf (last visited Sep. 29, 2005).
134.
Sergio Duarte, Ambassador-at-Large of Brazil for Disarmament and NonProliferation, Presentation at Annual Joint Forum-Canadian Pugwash Group and
Science for Peace, Genesis and Development of the NPT An Overview of the Review
Process, Apr. 17, 2004 (transcript available at http://www.pugwashgroup.calevents/
documents/2004/2004.04.17-Duarte-presentation.pd).
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permanent, or end it entirely. 135 Thus, in 1995 the NPT Review and
Extension Conference was held at the United Nations. 136 Without
taking a vote, the state parties agreed to extend the NPT
indefinitely. 1 37 In addition to extending the NPT indefinitely, the
parties also adopted two initiatives: (1) "Strengthening the Review
Process for the Treaty," which involves creating a new, more
substantive review process for the NPT; and (2) "Principles and
which
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," 138
sets out a program of action for full implementation of the NPT.
Under the new review process, Review Conferences will continue
to be held every five years as specified in the NPT. 13 9 The previous
purpose of the review conferences was to review the operation of the
NPT; however, with the adoption of this new agreement that purpose
has been expanded as follows:
Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should
evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the
implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty,
and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further
progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should
also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the
14 0
implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

Under this new structure for review conferences, preparatory
committees (PrepComs) were assigned the task of considering
"principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full
implementation of the NPT, as well as its universality, and to make
recommendations thereon to the Review Conference."' 14 1 The
"Principles and Objectives" set forth at the 1995 Review Conference
were specifically included as a topic for PrepComs to consider, and
according to the preamble of the "Principles and Objectives," its
contents should be evaluated periodically within the review
142
process.
The review conference held in 2000 was considered, by most, to
be a success. 143 First, the conference was deemed to be successful
because it was able to produce a final document, which is something
that had not occurred since the 1985 conference. 14 4 The state parties
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confirmed that the NPT, despite its imperfections, was the document
from which they expected to derive security benefits. 145 Second, in
constructing ways to strengthen the review process, the parties were
able to discuss
substantive questions pertaining to the
implementation of all provisions of the NPT, particularly those
involving nuclear disarmament. 146 Third, the nuclear states
expressed an "unequivocal undertaking" to bring about the complete
elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and in the end, attain the
ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. 147 Even more powerful was
the adoption of the thirteen practical steps 148 spelling out the
149
consensual measures necessary to achieve that goal.
While the future of the NPT certainly looked bright at the end of
the 2000 Review Conference, the international community has
experienced several incidents that have called the credibility and
authoritativeness of the NPT into question. Many thought that the
2005 Review Conference would properly address these issues and
bring the NPT back to the forefront of the battle against nuclear
proliferation. The 2005 Review Conference was held May 2-27 at the
United Nations, but unfortunately, it did not produce the desperately
needed revisions. 150 Most of the debate at this conference concerned
agenda and logistics rather than substantive discussions on how to
strengthen the nonproliferation regime. 151 The conference produced a
"final document," but rather than adopt measures to strengthen the
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disarmament issues; commitments to irreversibility, transparency and
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NPT, the document did nothing more than list the participants and
52
officials of the conference and how many meetings they held.'
Failure of this conference to come to an agreement does not end the
war against nuclear proliferation; instead, it reinforces the need for
some significant revisions to strengthen the NPT. During the
PrepComs for the 2005 Review Conference, several countries gave
suggestions on how the NPT could be strengthened. Even though the
2005 Review Conference did not produce any results regarding these
proposals, they are still relevant and can provide significant insight
for the PrepComs as they prepare a report for the 2010 Review
Conference.

V. STRENGTHENING THE NPT AGAINST WITHDRAWAL AND NONCOMPLIANCE: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES
AND MECHANISMS

A. Germany's Proposal
At the second PrepCom of the 2005 NPT Review process,
Germany introduced its suggestions on how to strengthen the NPT
against withdrawal and non-compliance.' 5 3 The proposal is split into
three parts: structuring the withdrawal process, structuring the
communication between NPT members, and structuring the reaction
to a withdrawal. 54 Germany began by stressing the significance of
the NPT as the most universal multilateral treaty and the need for it
55
to maintain its authority.'
First, Germany suggested that the 2005 Review Conference
establish an agreement on the rules and procedures to be observed
when a state intends to withdraw from the NPT. 15 6 This was
qualified by a statement that nothing in the agreement should limit
or exclude the right of states to withdraw from the NPT as set forth
by Article X of the NPT; rather, this agreement would merely set out
157
the procedures to be followed to procure an effective withdrawal.
Germany then suggested that the agreement define what constitutes
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an event that is "extraordinary" enough to trigger a possible
withdrawal. 158 The agreement should require a state contemplating
withdrawal from the NPT to submit, in writing, prior to the
notification of withdrawal provided by Article X, information
outlining the concerns that have led to its contemplation of
withdrawal from the NPT. 15 9 Immediately after this information is
furnished, but prior to the state's invocation of its withdrawal right
under Article X, the state considering withdrawal must conduct
consultations with NPT-state parties. 160 These consultations would
take place in the context of an extraordinary conference of the NPT,
and the purpose of the consultations would be to provide an arena for
developing alternatives to withdrawal, including adopting measures
within the bounds of the NPT to satisfy the stated security needs of
the party intending to withdraw. 16 1 Lastly, the right ,to withdraw
cannot be exercised by states that are not complying with the NPT or
facing allegations of noncompliance with the NPT (with relevant
162
investigations/procedures underway).
In addition to suggesting procedures that should be followed
before a withdrawal can be effectuated, Germany also suggested ways
that the NPT parties should react to a withdrawal. The priority of the
international community after a withdrawal should be to reduce the
possibility that the withdrawing state will still be able to benefit from
the technology and know-how that it has acquired under Article IV of
the NPT during its membership. 163 Germany admitted that this
would be difficult to do once a party has already withdrawn, but it
still made a number of suggestions for realizing this objective.
First, the members of the NPT should reinforce the argument
that membership in and full compliance with the NPT is of
paramount importance, to ensure that development of nuclear energy
will only be used for peaceful purposes and not to threaten
international security. 164 Second, the nuclear states that supply the
non-nuclear states with the materials that they need to develop
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should include a provision in
their delivery agreements stating that in the event that the country
withdraws from the NPT, the items delivered will remain under
IAEA safeguards. 165 Additionally, it should be made clear that any
nuclear equipment, technology, and know-how restricted to peaceful
purposes that is obtained by a member state of the NPT also has to
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remain subject to IAEA safeguards. 166 IF the country does not comply
with this restriction, an additional possibility would be to establish a
right for supplier countries or the IAEA to obtain immediate
restitution of material and technology delivered under Article IV of
the NPT in case the state withdraws from the NPT. 167 Ultimately,
one of the consequences of withdrawal could be a requirement that
the relevant facilities be closed, which would ensure that the
withdrawing state would not benefit from the knowledge that it has
obtained about the nuclear files as a result of being a party to the
NPT. 168 Last, Germany suggested that the members of the NPT
should reiterate that in accordance with international law, a state
that has withdrawn from the NPT can still be held accountable for
breaches or acts of non-compliance committed while still a party to
the NPT, and as a result, will still be subject to the regulations of the
relevant international institutions such as the IAEA and the U.N.
Security Council. 169 Finally, Germany's proposal addressed possible
procedures and communication rules that should be followed by the
members of the NPT when a party to the NPT is in violation of the
NPT by way of noncompliance. 170 At the outset, Germany stated that
any mechanisms adopted at the 2005 Review Conference regarding
procedures to be followed if non-compliance would not undermine the
role and obligations of the IAEA in such circumstances. 171 The
following two suggestions were offered: (1) establishment of a formal
point of contact system that would provide a forum for questions and
answers between the regular PrepCom meetings and the review
conferences themselves and (2) establishment of procedures so that
an extraordinary conference can be convened when serious violations
occur. 172 This emergency conference should be organized in such a
manner as to provide ample opportunities to discuss specific nonthe convening of such a
compliance cases. 173 The only limitation to 174
present.
be
must
quorum
a
that
conference is
B. France'sProposal
At the third session of the NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review
Conference, France submitted its proposal for strengthening the
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nuclear non-proliferation regime. 175 France's proposal is essentially
based on the following principles: "fostering the NPT and
international
institutions
(UN,
IAEA)
through
effective
multilateralism, restoring the confidence of the international
community, adopting an inclusive approach, and avoiding the
creation of dividing lines among the international community. 176 In
many respects, France's proposal is very similar to Germany's. For
example, with respect to withdrawal, France's proposal mirrors
Germany's because France's proposal advocates reaffirming the
principle that if a state withdraws from the NPT, it still remains
177
responsible for violations committed while subject to the NPT.
France also argued that the U.N. Security Council is the appropriate
international framework for making decisions in such a context. 178
Furthermore, France advocated the position that once a state has
withdrawn, it should no longer be allowed to make use of any nuclear
materials, facilities, equipment or technologies acquired from another
country as a result of being a member of the NPT before its
withdrawal. 1 79 France's suggestion of how to confiscate these
materials includes returning the equipment and materials to the
supplying state, either frozen or dismantled under international
18 0
verification.
France's proposal was also similar to Germany's with respect to
the measures that should be taken on the issues of compliance and
international cooperation. France suggests that Article IV of the NPT
can be strengthened by suspending nuclear cooperation with states if
the IAEA cannot provide satisfactory assurances that those states'
nuclear programs are devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.' 8 ' To
supplement this suggestion, France offered situations where
suspension would be appropriate: "a situation of 'serious breaches'; a
situation of 'non-compliance'; an 'unacceptable risk of diversion'; [and]
the impossibility, for the Agency, to carry out its mission. '18 2 If
appropriate corrective measures were taken by the state, however,
then automatic suspension would not occur.' 8 3 The reality of the
suspension could be made more severe by a decision of the U.N.
8 4
Security Council to make the suspension universal and mandatory.
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In addition to making proposals about what should happen once
a withdrawal has been effectuated, France suggested measures that
may, in effect, prevent a country from wanting to withdraw. First,
France called for a standard to be imposed on all parties to the NPT
whereby each party must take immediate steps to adhere to the
additional protocol.18 5 A duty that coincides with that responsibility
is one requiring each IAEA Member State to take measures to ensure
that the Agency has adequate technical and financial means to carry
"optimize
out its statutory mission.1 8 6 In turn, the IAEA should
18 7
safeguards implementation to fulfill its new missions.
France also recommends, as a means of strengthening the NPT,
that the export of nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or related
technologies should only be allowed when a set of conditions relevant
to the global non-proliferation regime and NPT objectives are
fulfilled.' 88 These conditions include:
an alleged need in the country; a credible nuclear power generation
program and related fuel cycle needs; an economically rational plan for
developing such projects; an Additional Protocol brought into force and
implemented before a physical transfer or transfer of know-how; the
highest standard of non-proliferation commitments; the effective and
efficient implementation of an export control system with adequate
sanctions; the highest standard of nuclear security and safety; an
189
analysis of the stability of the country and the region concerned.

Additionally, all parties involved in the export of these materials
should adopt responsible policies regarding nuclear exports. 190 As an
example, France proposes that the supplying state transferring

The aim of the Additional Protocol is to allow the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog
185.
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waste sites. They must also offer access to any other location where nuclear material is
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Nuclear NPT, IRAN MANIA, Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://www.iranmania.com/
News/ArticleView/?NewsCode=20758&NewsKind=Current+Affairs.
186.
France Working Paper, supra note 176, at 2.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 3.

1522

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.1499

materials to non-nuclear states should do so only if an intergovernmental agreement is signed prior to the transfer, creating a
legal basis and framework for such cooperation.1 91 Thus, it logically
follows that any transfer not covered by such an agreement will be
considered illegal, and legal action should be taken in accordance
with national regulations. 192 To soften the restrictions to non-nuclear
states that might feel over-regulated under France's plan, France
suggests balancing the stringent aforementioned policy by granting
the non-nuclear states easier access to non-sensitive equipment and
technologies and nuclear cooperation. 193 This could also include
agreeing to grant long term access to services related to nuclear fuel
or related services at market prices on a long-term basis. 194 Of course,
France qualified this "benefit" by stating that it is only available to
states that plan to use the resources for peaceful purposes and
further requires those countries to develop a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. 195
C. Canada'sProposal
Canada's proposal does not focus specifically on the area of
withdrawal. Instead, its recommendation, for the most part,
advocates strengthening changes in the review process so that the
review conferences can be more efficient in addressing the
weaknesses of the NPT, which, in effect, gives the NPT more
authority. 19 6 In place of the current PrepCom, Canada suggests that
annual general conference of state parties should be adopted to
consider and decide on any issues covered by the NPT. 197 Each
annual conference would last for one week, with the exception of the
conference that is held the year before a review conference, which
would be extended to two weeks to carry out the function of a
preparatory committee for that review conference.' 98 The overall time

191.
Id.
Id.
192.
See id. (proposing increased access to non-sensitive technologies and/or
193.
guarantees of access).
Id.
194.
See id. (suggesting that these countries should work with the IAEA in
195.
making these developments and such guarantees should avoid the creation of monopoly
situations).
See Canada, Overcoming the Institutional Deficit of the NPT 1-2 (NPT
196.
Conference 2005, Working Paper No. 1, 2004), available at www.reachingcriticalwill.
orgflegal/npt/prepcom04/papers/canadawpl.pdf (arguing that NPT membership is not
well-served by a situation where it can only exercise its decision-making functions once
every five years).
Id. at 1.
197.
Id.
198.
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allotted for these conferences would199not exceed the current six weeks
devoted to the preparatory process.
Furthermore, Canada advocates that the best way to carry out
these conferences is to establish a standing bureau of the NPT
comprised of the president and chairs of the quinquennial review
conference. 200 The elections for these positions would be held at the
end of each review conference with a mandate extending until the
subsequent review conference. 201 This bureau would have the
authorization, either by request of the depositary governments, the
U.N. Secretary General, or by a consensus decision of its own, to
assemble emergency sessions of the general conference of state
parties if threatening situations arose against the viability or
integrity of the NPT. 20 2 Finally, the bureau, the annual conferences,
and any emergency sessions would still be supported by the U.N.
20 3
Department of Disarmament Affairs.

VI. LOOKING BEYOND THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NPT:
WHAT TYPE OF PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND WHY

Because the 2005 Review Conference failed to produce the
changes needed, the parties to the NPT must now use the 2010
Review Conference as their opportunity to strengthen the NPT. The
three proposals have made suggestions that could strengthen the
NPT significantly, end the debate about the effect that North Korea's
withdrawal had on the NPT, and prevent future defiances. None of
the plans, however, with the exception of France's, contain any
incentive for the non-nuclear states to adopt any new proposals, nor
do they address the concern that has been discussed at every review
conference since the inception of that NPT, of when the nuclear states
are going to live up to their obligation to procure a "good faith effort"
to promote disarmament. Therefore, the proposal adopted by the 2010
Review Conference of the NPT should contain a provision addressing
this pertinent issue as well as a combination of the strongest parts of
the proposals articulated by Germany, France, and Canada.

Id.
199.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
Id. at 2 (For example, a notification of intent to withdraw from the NPT or
202.
the violation by a State Party of its obligations under the NPT).
Id.
203.
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A. Step One: Strengthen Article IV of the NPT by Imposing Stricter
Regulations on Both the Nuclear States and the Non-Nuclear States to
Adhere to the Promises Made Under the NPT
The first step in strengthening the NPT and avoiding future
occurrences of non-compliance with the NPT is to end the notion of a
"double standard" existing against the non-nuclear states in favor of
the nuclear states. The three proposals above perpetuated the
"double-standard" by suggesting even more stringent regulations of
the non-nuclear states regarding their obligations under Article IV
while completely ignoring the fact that the nuclear states have failed
to meet their obligation under Article VI to move towards nuclear
disarmament. The review conferences have lost sight of the fact that
the principal reason the non-nuclear states renounced their right to
use and develop nuclear weapons was because the nuclear states
promised to disarm. 20 4 With that in mind, it is time that more
pressure is put on the nuclear states to uphold their part of the
bargain, especially in light of the fact that the nuclear states have not
completely adhered to the CTBT and the thirteen steps set forth at
the 2000 Review Conference.20 5 Just as demands are being placed on
the non-nuclear states to adhere to the procedures and guidelines set
forth regarding the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
demands should be placed on nuclear states to actively pursue
disarmament.
Since the threat of denying nuclear energy to nuclear states has
no force, the way that this goal can be achieved is to impose sanctions
on the nuclear states to ensure compliance. First, the review
conference should set a specific goal of how many weapons should be
disarmed by the next review conference. The ramifications of not
achieving the goals set forth at the conference within the specified
timeframe should be a large monetary fine against the nuclear state.
The money collected as a result of these sanctions could then be used
to fund the IAEA in its implementation of safeguard agreements. It
may seem that the nuclear states could easily refuse to pay the fine or
simply refuse to be sanctioned. That type of refusal, however, would

204.
France Annecy, The Roadmap to 2005: Where do we want to go and how
should we get there?, MONTEREY INST. OF INT'L STUD., March 7-8, 2004, at 7, available
at http://cns.miis.edu/researchlnpt/pdf/annency-final-report.pdf.
205.
Johnson, supra note 149. Many of the nuclear states have interpreted the
commitments in such a way as to renege on the agreement. France and Russia have
complained that they have been forced into accepting more than they originally
intended. China quietly ignored the thirteen steps while modernizing its arsenal. The
United States, however, has reneged on many of its promises by publicly opposing the
CTBT and making clear that it wants the NPT to deal with noncompliance. This is
exemplified by the comment made by John Bolton as U.S. Undersecretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, "We cannot divert attention from the
violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist." Id.
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be a direct act of defiance, just as North Korea's actions were.
Furthermore, if the nuclear states truly want to ensure international
security against a nuclear war, they would agree to such sanctions if
for no other reason than to lead by example and show the non-nuclear
states that any state that does not adhere to its obligations under the
NPT should and will have to suffer repercussions.
In addition, to ensure that non-nuclear states are using nuclear
energy obtained under Article IV for peaceful purposes, the
conference should adopt France's proposal that such materials,
facilities, equipment or related technologies should only be exported if
certain conditions are met. 20 6 As an incentive to those states that
would be required to adhere to this new provision, France's proposal
regarding increased access to non-sensitive technologies should also
be adopted.2 0 7 Just as sanctions will be imposed on nuclear states for
not adhering to their obligations under the NPT, sanctions should be
imposed on the non-nuclear states if they use their nuclear resources
for anything other than peaceful purposes. The best way to address
this is to adopt France's proposal to suspend nuclear cooperation with
states that cannot provide sufficient assurances that their nuclear
programs are devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. 20 8 This
suspension should be initiated in situations involving serious
breaches, non-compliance or a risk of diversion. 20 9 If the problem
cannot be solved during suspension, then the ultimate solution should
be to demand that all nuclear resources be returned to the supplying
210
country.
B. Step Two: Strengthen Article X of the NPT by Adopting an
Addendum to the Withdrawal Provision Stating the Strict Guidelines
and Proceduresthat Govern the Process of Withdrawal
The proposals of Germany and France with respect to the
withdrawal provisions appear to efficiently achieve the goal of
strengthening Article X, so a combination of the two should be
adopted. First and foremost, the addendum should, as suggested by

206.
See France Working Paper, supra note 176, at 2 (listing the conditions that
should be met before exports are permitted).
207.
Id. at 3.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
Compare id. at 4 (suggesting that a state that withdraws should no longer
210.
make use of nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies acquired from third
parties before its withdrawal) with Germany Working Paper, supra note 154, at 3
(suggesting that a country that withdraws from the NPT should not be allowed to
benefit from the capacities and technological knowledge that it has established in the
nuclear field as a result of having made use of Article IV of the NPT. As a result, the
withdrawing should be required to return all materials obtained to the supplying
country).
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Germany, adopt the notion that the option of withdrawal cannot be
exercised if the country contemplating withdrawal is under
investigation for non-compliance with the NPT. Of course, if after an
investigation has ensued there is no conclusive proof of
noncompliance, then the country should be allowed to begin the
process for withdrawal. Including such a provision would eliminate
the escape route taken by North Korea when it withdrew from the
NPT to avoid additional inspections in 1994 and 2003, which
21 1
arguably suspended the power of the IAEA to inspect its facilities.
Another provision that would be of paramount importance in
preventing future withdrawals such as the one by North Korea would
be a provision defining the type of event that is "extraordinary"
enough to trigger the withdrawal provision of Article X. Under the
current construction of Article X, a country justifies its withdrawal by
determining that an "extraordinary event" has jeopardized its
supreme interests. By defining extraordinary events, the right to
withdraw will become more structured and will no longer leave room
for a country to be able to receive nuclear technology and material for
peaceful purposes and then unilaterally decide that an "extraordinary
event" has jeopardized its supreme interests, thereby enabling it to
withdraw from the NPT and develop a nuclear weapons program.
A crucial aspect of this plan to solidify the withdrawal provision
is, as Germany suggested, a requirement that a country considering
withdrawal give prior notice to all NPT parties outlining its concerns,
as well as a requirement of mandatory participation in consultations
to explore ways to address the concerns of the country and find an
alternative to withdrawal. This, too, would prove to be a powerful
mechanism against withdrawal while maintaining the integrity of the
NPT and furthering one of its central purposes: the maintenance of
international security against nuclear weapons and nuclear war. For
example, North Korea cited as its reason for withdrawal a need to
defend itself against the actions of the United States and accused the
IAEA of allowing itself to be used as an instigator of the threat. If this
new provision had been in place, North Korea would have had to give
prior notice to the parties of the NPT of its concerns, a consultation
would have been held, and the NPT parties could have adopted
measures to satisfy the security concerns of North Korea. If the
security concerns of North Korea had been met, the reason for North
Korea's withdrawal would have been extinguished and withdrawal
would have no longer been necessary (assuming North Korea was
being honest about its reasons for withdrawal). Thus, as long as the

211.
But see Antonio F. Perez, Survival Rights Under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic
Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 749, 797 (1994) (arguing that some
safeguard rights should survive NPT withdrawal).
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NPT parties can be informed about the perceived insecurity of a party
considering withdrawal and can demonstrate that they are
empowered to protect, and, in fact, will protect the parties of NPT,
then the NPT's authority in the international community will be
enhanced.
C. Step Three: Adopt Canada'sProposalto Restructure the Review
Process
For the preceding changes to be effective, the NPT review
process must be improved. As it stands, there is only one opportunity
for any changes to be made to the NPT and that occurs every five
years. Admittedly, there are PrepCom meetings in between the
review conferences, but they lack the authority to make any
decisions. Those sessions merely prepare the agenda and set forth the
issues that will be discussed at the review conference. There are also
no mechanisms in place that allow the NPT members to deal with
emergency situations. By replacing these preparatory meetings with
annual general conferences, pertinent issues that occur throughout
the five-year time frame for the review conference can be adequately
addressed and remedied. For example, North Korea's withdrawal
took place on January 10, 2003. Yet since the review conference was
not until May 2005, no authoritative action has been taken in
response to North Korea's withdrawal; instead, only minor debates
about what should be done have taken place. By implementing these
annual general conferences and creating a bureau with the power to
convene extraordinary sessions to address issues that threaten the
vitality of the NPT, the members of the NPT can more readily
address pertinent issues that threaten the NPT's authority. Then, at
the review conference, which will still be held every five years, any
extraordinary events that have occurred can be discussed and
methods of prevention can be analyzed and implemented as
necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION

As a result of the recent acts of terrorism and attempts of
various nations to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT is more
important today than ever before. If measured by the prediction of
President Kennedy over forty years ago that fifteen to twenty
countries would possess nuclear weapons by 1975, the success of the
NPT is noteworthy since only eight countries currently possess
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nuclear weapons. 2 12 But juxtaposing this small number of eight
countries with the fact that three of the countries that possess
nuclear weapons are outside of the NPT demonstrates the need for
some changes to be made to revitalize and strengthen the NPT as an
effective solution to preventing nuclear proliferation. The fact that
the 2005 Review Conference did not make any revisions has left the
NPT in a vulnerable state for the next five years, until the 2010
Review Conference is held. To achieve an effective solution, the key
issues that need to be addressed at the PrepComs and at the 2010
Review Conference are: how to prevent withdrawals such as the one
initiated by North Korea; how to motivate nuclear states to carry out
their obligations under the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament; and
lastly, how to improve the review process in order to exert more
pressure for full implementation and accountability under the NPT.
These issues can effectively be addressed by adopting an
addendum to the NPT, imposing new requirements and obligations
under the withdrawal provision of Article X, through the peaceful use
and nuclear disarmament requirements of Article IV, and by
implementing a new structure for the review process of the NPT. The
withdrawal provision can effectively be strengthened by requiring
prior notification of reasons for withdrawal to the parties of the NPT,
followed by a mandatory consultation session whereby the country
considering withdrawal can have its security interests adequately
addressed and resolved. Articles IV and VI can be strengthened by
imposing more strenuous regulations on both the nuclear states and
the non-nuclear states to adhere to their obligations under the NPT.
The consequences of noncompliance by the non-nuclear states would
be the revocation of all nuclear materials, facilities, and knowledge
obtained as a result of participating in the NPT, while the penalty for
defiance by nuclear states would be a monetary fine to help fund the
mission of the IAEA. Compliance with such sanctions can be ensured
by the domestic and international pressure that will be exerted on the
state by a high-level conference of NPT parties. 213 With that in mind,
it is imperative that the review process itself be strengthened. The
best way to do this would be to establish a bureau, consisting of the
president and chairs of the review conference, that can hold annual
general review conferences to consider and decide on any issue
covered by the NPT. This bureau should also be empowered to call
emergency sessions in the event something that extraordinary

212.

Jean du Preez, The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects

Ahead, MONTEREY INST. OF INT'L STUD., available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/

05revconf.htm.
213.
See Johnson, supra note 149, at 18 ("No state, however hegemonic or
isolated, is immune to all the pressures from domestic or international opinion and
interests, so a high-level conference of NPT parties would inevitably feed into a
potential violator's political calculations and could make all the difference.").

2005/

REVISING THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

1529

threatens the NPT. Once these necessary changes are made, the
credibility of the NPT will be restored and any future attempts to
undermine the NPT can be handled expeditiously and efficiently.
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